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Public Broadcasting and the
Compulsory License
By JOHN J. TIMMEL*

Section 118 df the new Copyright Act became effective on January 1, 1978.' Among other subjects within its purview, the section
mandates licensing for certain uses of published, nondramatic, musical works by noncommercial broadcasting.
The inclusion of such a provision in the general revision of the
Copyright Law was, of course, done at the behest of the public
broadcasting industry.8 It was claimed at the time revision was be* Staff attorney, Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI) New York, New York; Member, State Bar
of New York; B.A., Fairfield University, 1966; J.D., St. John's University School of Law,
1972.
1. Section 118 of the new Copyright Act (17 U.S.C. §§ 101-108 (Supp. III 1979)) was
adopted from a bill introduced by Senator Charles Mathias as S.1361, Amendment No.
1815, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. Aug. 19, 1974 (90 Stat. 2541 (1976)). In its final form the amendment empowers the Copyright Royalty Tribunal to establish a schedule of rates and terms
which is binding on all owners of copyright in certain specified works and other broadcasting entities. See note 7, infra.
2. Section 118 also grants public broadcasting a compulsory license for use of pictorial,
graphic and sculptural works, subject to payment of royalty fees set by the Copyright Royalty Tribunal. 17 U.S.C. § 118.
Although § 118 refers to "public broadcasting entities," the section applies to "noncommercial educational broadcast stations" as defined in 47 U.S.C. § 397:
[A] television or radio broadcast station, which (A) under the rules and regulations of the Federal Communications Commission in effect on November 7, 1967,
is eligible to be licensed or is licensed by the Commission as a noncommercial
educational radio or television broadcast station and which is owned and operated
by a public agency or nonprofit private foundation, corporation, or association or
(B) is owned and operated by a municipality and which transmits only noncommercial programs for educational purposes.
47 U.S.C. § 397(7) (1976). The term "public television" was coined by the Carnegie Commission because the name "educational television" "calls to mind the school room and the lecture hall. It frightens away from educational channels many of those who might enjoy them
most." THE CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON EDUCATIONAL TELEVISION, PuBLIC TELEvISION: A PROGRAM FOR ACTION 14-15 (1967). "Public" in this sense is synonymous with "educational," i.e.,
"primarily designed for educational and cultural purposes." ROBERT J. BLAKELY, To SERvE
THE PUBLIC INTEREST. EDUCATIONAL BROADCASTING IN THE UNITED STATES 187 (1979). How-

ever "public broadcasting" should be distinguished from "instructional television," which
for the purposes of the new copyright law is defined in 17 U.S.C. § 110(2).
3. S. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 100 (1975).
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ing considered that a special need for compulsory licensing existed.
Characteristics peculiar to public broadcasting - including the
"special nature of programming," the "repeated use of programs,"
the "varied types of producing organizations" and the "limited extent of financial resources" - were said to necessitate compulsory
licensing.' Public broadcasters, in lobbying for licensing for musical works, also expressed a fear that in the absence of such compulsory licensing, small, noncommercial stations could be forced
into costly and time consuming arbitration, or federal court
proceedings.5
The House Committee on the Judiciary determined that the nature of public broadcasting did warrant special treatment in certain areas.e It approved the compulsory license. Later, the Copyright Royalty Tribunal,7 in fulfilling its mandate to report and
make recommendations to Congress, prepared its findings concerning section 118. Although the report was due before Congress on
January 3, 1980, the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) and National Public Radio (NPR) suggested that it was premature and
4. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration
of Justice of House Comm. on the Judiciary, on H.R. 2223, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 865-66
(1975).
5. Oler, Legislating Copyright Protection for Works Used in Public Broadcasting, 25
COPYRIGHT BULL. 118, 130 (1977-1978).
6. H. R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 117 (1976).
7. The Copyright Royalty Tribunal was created by sections 801-803 of the new Copyright
Act (17 U.S.C. §§ 801-03). Its purposes are: (1) to make determinations concerning the adjustment of reasonable copyright royalty rates and reasonable terms and rates of royalty
payments; and (2) to distribute royalty fees deposited with the Register of Copyrights and
to determine, in cases of controversy, how such fees will be distributed. Additionally, the
Tribunal is charged with protecting the respective interests of the copyright owner and user,
safeguarding the industries involved from disruptive impacts and maximizing the availability of creative works to the public. See generally, Brylawski, The Copyright Tribunal, 35
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1265 (1977).
Report of the Copyright Royalty Tribunal on "Use Of Certain Copyrighted Works In
Connection With Noncommercial Broadcasting" As Required By 37 CFR 304.14 (Jan. 22,
1980) (hereafter cited as Tribunal Report] is reprinted below at pp. 41-51. Public broadcasters have objected to the manner in which the Tribunal reached the conclusions contained in
its report. Indeed, PBS objected to the report being issued at all. The fact is, however, that
the Tribunal had ample evidence before it when it reached its decision. The ASCAP license
fee proceedings, for example, had been quite lengthy and elicited a large amount of evidence
which had a bearing on the question of the continued need for a compulsory license. It is a
legitimate and, indeed, a necessary function of the Tribunal to make recommendations to
Congress in the areas of its statutory responsibility. The fact that one report or another may
not have been specifically authorized is not particularly important. Indeed, if the Tribunal
was to limit its reports to only those which are specifically provided for by the 1976 Copyright Act, very little would ever be heard from it again by the Congress.
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asked that it be postponed.8 The petition was denied and the report was issued on January 22, 1980.
In that report, the Tribunal concluded that the concerns of public broadcasting representatives and their insistence upon the necessity for a compulsory license were not well-founded. The Tribunal asserted that the programming needs of public broadcasting for
performing rights in musical works could be fully met through
blanket licensing arrangements with the performing rights societies.9 The Tribunal recalled findings of its earlier public broadcasting proceeding that the "blanket license is the most suitable
method for licensing public broadcasting to perform musical
works."10
After considering public broadcasting's claim that its limited administrative and financial resources precluded it from relying on
the customary functioning of the copyright system, the Tribunal
found that there was no necessity for a compulsory license for the
performance by public broadcasting of nondramatic musical works.
To the contrary, it found that the statutory structure may have
increased unduly the enforcement burden in this area.".
8. Tribunal Report at 2. See p. 43 below.
9. Tribunal Report at 4. See p. 45 below. A blanket license enables music users to perform
all the works in the catalog of a performing rights licensing organization for the payment of
a single fee. It is a tremendous benefit for the music user for the following reasons:
(1) He is freed from the obligation of identifying and contacting the copyright
owners of every copyrighted work he wishes to make use of. The practical difficulty in doing this can easily be imagined.
(2) Assuming contact has been made, he must then negotiate with the copyright
owner to arrive at a license fee for his proposed use. This could involve literally
hundreds of negotiations over the course of a year and would, ultimately, prove to
be far more costly than a blanket license.
(3) With a blanket license the user pays a single fee and knows that he is fully
protected from potential copyright violations. It saves him quite a bit of time and
money. It also relieves the copyright owner from countless individual negotiations
with thousands of music users from all over the country and, indeed, the world.
The expense of his doing so would be so prohibitive that either the cost of his
product, i.e., music, would have to be greatly increased or the compensation paid
to the creators of the music, the writers, would have to be greatly reduced.
The blanket license has proven to be the best vehicle for the licensing of music, for it delivers a product to the consumer at the lowest possible cost while providing fair compensation
to the music writers. It is for these reasons that the Tribunal has concluded that the blanket
license is the most suitable method for licensing public broadcasting to perform music
works.
10. 43 Fed. Reg. 25,069 (June 8, 1978).
11. Tribunal Report at 5. See p. 46 below.
In the words of Copyright Royalty Commissioner Thomas C. Brennan, when the issue of
compulsory licensing was discussed in Congress: those "who usually proclaim the virtues of
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Public broadcasters suggest that, without the protection of a
compulsory license, they will regularly be forced into arbitration or
litigation. That rarely occurs in practice. Licensing agreements are,
as a rule, quickly and amicably arrived at between music licensing
organizations and broadcasters. The present statutory structure,
however, includes a third entity - the Tribunal. By its own admission, the Tribunal concedes that its existence entails "expenses
and other burdens that can be obviated by reliance on the customary functioning of the copyright system without interfering with
the programming activities of public broadcasting stations." In
other words, the Tribunal acknowledged that its involvement as a
government entity entailed (impliedly unnecessary) reporting requirements, hearings, proceedings, rulings, counsel fees, etc.
The history of governmental participation in virtually every area
of human endeavor bears out the truth of this notion and yet public broadcasters have criticized the Tribunal for not indulging in
even more formal proceedings and more oral argument, and for not
requiring the production of more documents prior to the issuance
of its report.
The Tribunal determined that none of the other arguments
presented in support of the compulsory license had any basis in
fact.12 It concluded that the compulsory license was not necessary
for the efficient operation of public broadcasting and constituted
an inappropriate interference with the traditional functioning of
the copyright system and the artistic and economic freedom of
those creators whose works are subject to its provisions."
It is this very freedom that BMI is most concerned with. Since
its founding, BMI's purpose has been to ensure that the creators of
music receive fair compensation for the use of their property."
the market place were promoting government intervention, while well-known civil libertarians were insisting that an author must not be allowed to prevent the public performance of
his work." Brennan, Some Observations on the Revision of the Copyright Law from the
Legislative Point of View, 24 COPYRIGHT BULL. 151,152 (1976-1977).
12. Tribunal Report at 5. See p. 45 below. For example, the public broadcasters' claim
that small, non-commercial stations could not clear recording rights through organizations
in New York as quickly as a commercial producer cannot be substantiated.
13. Id. at 5. See p. 46 below.
14. Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI) is the world's largest music licensing organization with
nearly 60,000 writer and publisher affiliates. Founded in 1940, it offers music users a repertoire of over 1,000,000 compositions and has reciprocal agreements with 39 licensing societies world-wide. A nonprofit organization, BMI collects license fees for the public performance of music and distributes all of its income, less operating expenses and a reserve fund,
to its writer and publisher affiliates on the basis of performances.
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Does a compulsory license help achieve this? BMI believes that it
clearly does not, believing as the Tribunal did that there is no basis for extending special consideration to public broadcasters in the
area of music licensing. The creators of music should be able to
enter into arms-length negotiations with public broadcasters in the
same manner as they do with other music users: freely and without
compulsion.
The idea of a compulsory license constitutes an incipient threat
to holders of all copyrights, not merely to holders of music copyrights. If the government can compel music licensors to sell their
product at a certain price, there is nothing, theoretically, to prevent it from extending the practice to other businesses. Indeed,
once the idea becomes established as a legitimate exercise of governmental authority, its extension is almost inevitable."
Prior to the passage of the 1976 Copyright Act, public broadcasting used music composers' works extensively and left them unrewarded. Their works were heard on college and university campuses, but there was no compensation. Jukebox owners exploited
compositions free of any obligation to pay for them. The compulsory license perpetuates this unfair treatment because under its
auspices, copyright holders do not have the right to decide who will
use their creations and under what circumstances. Government buDo the creators of music have the same rights under a compulsory license as they do
under one that is not compulsory? One of the definitions of the world "compel" is "to urge
with force." Does that suggest an expansion or a diminution of rights? By definition, anything that is mandated under threat of force necessarily involves a limitation and a restriction of rights. To assert otherwise is spurious.
For the effects of compulsory licensing on investment in the production of musical compositions see Goldstein, Preempted State Doctrines, Involuntary Transfers and Compulsory
Licenses: Testing the Limits of Copyright, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1107, 1136 n.118 (1977).
15. "It is clear that the dominant trend in the copyright legislation was the reliance by
the Congress on the device of a compulsory license to facilitate access to copyrighted materials by users." Brennan, supra, note 11, at 152. See generally Ringer, Copyright in the
1980's, 23 COPYRIGHT BULL. 299 (1975-76).
The Communications Act of 1934 (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 301-609 (1976)) empowered
the FCC to set aside certain noncommercial educational radio, and later, television stations
to be used purely for educational and civic purposes. While these stations remained largely
instructional, copyright owners had not pressed the issue of performance license when their
works were broadcast. However, by the late 1960's, the structure of noncommercial instructional broadcasting changed. The Public Broadcasting Service, arising from Public Broadcasting Act of 1967 (47 U.S.C. §§ 390 et seq. (1967) has expanded the fare offered by these
noncommercial stations so that the programming can scarcely be distinguished from that
broadcast by commercial stations. It no longer seems reasonable to allow PBS to broadcast a
copyrighted piece under different terms than a commercial station. See Korman, Performance Rights in Music Under Sections 110 and 118 of the 1976 Copyright Act, 22 N.Y. L.
ScH. L. REV. 521, 537-39 (1977).
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reaucrats decide that. In addition, it can well mean that they have
little to say about how much they will be paid for the use of their
work, since the going rates are decided by the government.
Fortunately, the revised Copyright statute provides that voluntary license agreements negotiated at any time between copyright
owners and public broadcasting entities shall supersede the rates
and terms established by the Tribunal." Thus, in those cases, compulsory licenses could be rendered moot and, therefore,
unnecessary.

Every effort should be made by public broadcasters and the music licensing organizations to arrive at such voluntary agreements.
In the unlikely event that such agreements cannot be reached, arbitration would be the preferable way of resolving the question.
This approach would be less costly to all parties concerned in
terms of time, effort and money.17
When compulsory licensing was first proposed, the arguments
urged in support of it may have seemed plausible. Congress had
the right and the duty to consider these and other arguments
before finding that a compulsory license was necessary. Now the
Copyright Tribunal, after more than two years of study, has offered a fresh appraisal of the question. It has concluded that the
concerns expressed by public broadcasters are not as compelling as
initially thought. Reasonable exceptions to the exclusive rights of
writers and copyright proprietors can be justified when necessary
to promote public policy. However, the underwriting of public
broadcasting at the expense of writers and publishers should never
be considered as part of that policy.
The Tribunal, on the basis of its reconsideration of section 118's
application and effects, believes that the public broadcasting com16. 17 U.S.C. § 118(b)(2).
17. Arbitration would be less costly than a formal proceeding before the Tribunal for a
number of reasons:
(1) Arbitration procedures are more informal;
(2) Protracted hearings are not necessary;
(3) Extensive briefs are not generally required, including post and pre-hearing
briefs;
(4) Arbitration would be faster, both in terms of obtaining a hearing and in arriving at the result;
(5), Arbitration procedures are less complicated and "bureaucratic." It would
take less time to present a case; and
(6) Less time and fewer complications mean smaller counsel fees. That can be a
very important consideration in any controversy.
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pulsory license fails to meet that criterion and, hence, is not
justified.
The compulsory license is an idea whose time has come - and
gone. BMI joins with the Tribunal in recommending that it be reconsidered by the Congress at the earliest appropriate time.

